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REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
In their respective Briefs, both the State and City Defendants 
have set forth their own versions of the facts of this case. 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts in her Appellant's Brief clearly and 
concisely sets forth the relevant facts of this case, with 
appropriate references to the record on appeal. The State and City 
Defendants have restated the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, in a light most favorable to the Defendants, not the 
Plaintiff. 
The Defendants' attempts to skew the facts in favor of their 
arguments are inappropriate and contrary to clear Utah law 
regarding the standard of appellate review to be applied by this 
Court upon review of the summary judgments granted for the 
Defendants. The facts must be considered by this Court as 
contended by Plaintiff, as if they were the only credible evidence 
before the Court. (See Standards of Appellate Review set forth on 
pp. 1-2 of Appellant's Original Brief). 
In addition, the Defendants inappropriately include conclu-
sions or beliefs of Trooper Colyar and Steven Floyd as "facts" 
regarding whether or not the respective Defendants were negligent 
in this case. The Defendants have used their Statements of Facts 
to inappropriately argue jury questions. 
After reading the State's version of the facts of this case, 
this Court might conclude that the high-speed chase of the Floyd 
vehicle by Trooper Colyar was merely routine, went smoothly, and 
did not endanger the public. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. The truth is that this high-speed chase was totally out of 
control and endangered the lives and property of all meinbers of the 
1 
general public on or near the roads and highways utilized in the 
chase. Indeed, the most tragic and sobering fact of all is that 
Plaintiff's husband was killed and Plaintiff was seriously and 
permanently injured as a direct result of this high-speed chase. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or 
rules determinative of or pertinent to the issues presented in this 
appeal is contained in Plaintiff's original Brief, the body of this 
Reply Brief, or in the Addendum to this Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPLICATION OF FORMER U.C.A. S 63-30-7(2) (AMENDED 1990 
AND REPEALED 1991) TO PLAINTIFF VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Defendants, particularly the State Defendants, have 
misconstrued, mischaracterized, and apparently misunderstood 
Plaintiff's constitutional arguments in regard to why former U.C.A. 
§ 63-30-7(2) violates the open courts provisions of Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution if applied to Plaintiff's 
causes of action. The Defendants argue Plaintiff had no remedy at 
common law and therefore former Section 63-3-7(2) did not eliminate 
an existing common law remedy in violation of Article I, Section 
11. 
The State specifically argues it was absolutely immune from 
tort liability at common law, and even the proprietary/governmental 
2 
function distinction did not apply to the State.1 Even if the 
proprietary/governmental function distinction is applied, the State 
argues that Trooper Colyar was engaged in a governmental function 
in the high-speed chase. Thus, the State argues, the State is 
totally immune because the State would have been immune at common 
law for injuries resulting from the pursuit. The conclusion of the 
State's argument is since Plaintiff had no remedy against the State 
under common law at the time of statehood, Plaintiff had no remedy 
or right to recover protected by the open courts provisions of 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Defendants have completely missed the boat in regard to 
the thrust of Plaintiff's constitutional argument regarding 
violation of Article I, Section 11. As will be demonstrated below, 
the open courts violation occurs because the common law right to 
sue individual governmental employees for their negligent acts was 
eventually taken away by the Governmental Immunity Act, and former 
U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) then took away the substitute remedy against 
governmental entities for the negligent acts of their employees. 
When this occurred, Plaintiff's constitutional right under the open 
1
 The State points out that the arguments made in the State's 
Brief essentially reiterate, in abbreviated form, the arguments 
made by the Appellants and the State in Hipwell v. Sharp. Supreme 
Court No. 920218, which has been argued orally and is currently 
under advisement by the Utah Supreme Court. In Hipwell. as in the 
instant case, the State is arguing that the Utah Supreme Court 
erred in Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1989), by applying the proprietary/governmental function distinc-
tion to a state entity under early common law. This argument is a 
"red herring" and inapposite to the instant case. Plaintiff's 
constitutional arguments do not depend at all on the proprietary/ 
governmental distinction or the State's common law tort liability. 
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courts provisions of the Utah Constitution to redress of her 
injuries in the courts was violated. 
A. Governmental employees were liable for their negligent acts at 
common law.2 
Commentators have recognized that under the early common law 
there was no distinction between the liability of public officials 
and ordinary citizens for negligence. See, e.g., W. Gellhorn and 
C. Byse, Administrative Law. § 8 at p. 335-36 (6th Ed. 1974) ; 
G. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability. 77 
Columbia L.Rev. 1175-78 (1977) ; J. Flemming, Tort Liability of 
Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.Chi.L.Rev. 610, 635 
(1955). For example, Professor Bermann wrote in the Columbia Law 
Review cited above: 
The restlessness of the courts on the ques-
tion of officer immunity reflects conflicting 
policy considerations. On the one hand, 
wrongdoing seems worth deterring or punishing 
whatever hat the wrongdoer happens to wear. 
Moreover, there is something anomalous about 
denying relief to a tort victim simply because 
he had the added misfortune of being injured 
by a public official rather than a private 
citizen. Thus, the common law traditionally 
did not distinguish between public officials 
and private individuals for purposes of deter-
mining the scope of personal tort liability. 
In fact, courts that drew such a distinction 
often imposed a stricter standard of care on 
officials than on private individuals, holding 
them personally liable for the consequences of 
simple non-negligent mistakes. 
77 Columbia L.Rev. at 1178-79 (emphasis added). 
Professor Bermann's article goes on to state that "more 
recently" courts have applied the discretionary/ministerial 
2
 The arguments under Subpoint A of Point I of this Reply 
Brief substantially reiterate and/or expound upon arguments made by 
the Plaintiffs/Appellees in Hipwell v. Sharp, supra. 
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distinction to governmental employees in determining their personal 
liability. Id. 
Professor Flemming expounded upon this issue in his article in 
the University of Chicago Law Review as follows: 
The Anglo-American tradition did not include 
a theory of immunity from suit or from liabil-
ity on the part of public officers. It was 
the boast of Dicey, often-quoted, that "[w]ith 
us every official, from the Prime Minister 
down to a constable or collector of taxes, is 
under the same responsibility for every act 
done without legal justification as any other 
citizen." . . . [H]e was liable in very much 
the same way as a private individual, includ-
ing the employee of a private business, would 
be. Thus, were an officer, authorized by 
statute to seize undried leather, mistakenly 
but in good faith seized what turned out to be 
dried leather, he was liable as a trespasser. 
22 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 635 (emphasis added). 
The common law on this issue in effect at the time of the 
adoption of the Utah Constitution in 1896 is well illustrated by 
Justice Holmes7 decision in Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100 (Mass. 
1891). In that case, the town commissioners determined that the 
plaintiffs7 horse had a contagious disease and ordered the Board of 
Health to destroy the animal. The trial court found that the horse 
did not in fact have the contagious disease, but held that the 
defendants were nevertheless protected from liability. Justice 
Holmes held that the man who killed the horse was not protected 
from liability by the fact that he had been ordered to do so by the 
commissioners if the horse did not have the contagious disease, and 
was fully liable for his wrongful act in destroying the horse. See 
also, Lowe v. Conroy, 97 N.W. 942 (Wis. 1904) ; Davie v. Regents of 
University of California. 227 P. 247 (Cal. 1924). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has also commented on this issue in the 
fairly recent case of Payne ex rel. Payne v. Mvers. 743 P.2d 186 
(Utah 1987), in which the Court stated that doctors as governmental 
employees had no immunity from suit for their simple negligence at 
common law. 743 P.2d at 188. The Court further stated as follows: 
"Generally, at common law, one who suffers injury to his person or 
property because of the negligence of another has a right of action 
in tort. 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 175, at 305 (1966)." (emphasis 
added). Id. 
The discretionary ministerial distinction with respect to the 
liability of governmental employees appears to have its roots in 
the principle that judicial officers were absolutely immune from 
liability in discharging their functions. This principle was later 
expanded to quasi-judicial officers and then to administrative 
employees as well. W. Gellhorn and C. Byse, Administrative Law, 
supra. at p. 337-38. However, it does not appear that the 
discretionary/ministerial distinction immunizing governmental 
employees for discretionary acts gained much acceptance until the 
1920's and 1930's, well after Utah became a state in 1896. See, 
e.g. , Wasserman v. Kenosha, 258 N.W. 857 (Wis. 1935); Gottschalk v. 
Shepperd. 270 N.W. 573 (N.D. 1935). 
B, The Utah Governmental Immunity Act has taken away the common 
law right to sue individual governmental employees for their 
negligent acts. 
When the Utah Governmental Immunity Act became effective in 
1966, it had no provisions regarding the immunity of governmental 
officials and employees. Its function was confined to governmental 
entities. Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980). In 1978, 
Section 63-30-4 of the Act (Addendum 1) was amended to provide that 
6 
governmental employees could only be personally liable for their 
gross negligence, fraud or malice. Thus, the common law right to 
sue individual governmental employees for simple negligence was 
first abrogated in 1978. Subsequently, in 1983, Section 63-30-4 
was again amended to provide that a governmental employee could 
only be personally liable for fraud or malice, thus eliminating 
even the gross negligence cause of action (Addendum 2). 
Pursuant to Section 63-30-4, the trial court in the instant 
case ruled that Defendants Ken Colyar, Brad James and Ed Asay (the 
pursuing police officers) must remain as parties to the lawsuit in 
a representative capacity only, but no personal liability can 
attach to these individual Defendants as a result of their 
representative status (R. 80-82, 345-346, 525-526). 
Therefore, Plaintiff's common law right to sue said individual 
Defendants, and other as-yet unnamed governmental employees for 
their negligent acts and omissions, has been taken away by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and the trial court's Orders applying the 
Act to Plaintiff's causes of action. 
C. The Act, both prior and subsequent to the time former U.C.A. 
S 63-30-7(2) was in effect, has substituted a reasonably 
equivalent remedy against governmental entities. 
In 1978, when the Act first took away the right to sue 
individual governmental employees for simple negligence, and again 
in 1983, when the Act further took away the right to sue even for 
gross negligence, the Act had substituted a reasonably equivalent 
remedy against a governmental entity employing the individual 
governmental employee. Sections 63-30-7 and 63-30-10 continued to 
provide a remedy against the governmental entity for the negligent 
acts and omissions of governmental employees. 
7 
Specifically in regard to Plaintiff's causes of action for 
negligence in the instant case for the high-speed pursuit, Section 
63-30-7 waived immunity from suit of all governmental entities for 
injury resulting from the negligent operation of motor vehicles by 
governmental employees until 1990. Thus, the Act continued to 
offer a substitute remedy against governmental entities when it 
took away the right to sue individual governmental employees for 
simple negligence in 1978 and even gross negligence in 1983. 
However, when subsection (2) to Section 63-30-7 was enacted 
and became effective in 1990, it provided for complete and total 
immunity for all governmental entities for injury resulting from 
the collision of a pursued vehicle in high-speed police pursuits. 
After an effective period of one year and six days, subsection (2) 
was repealed by the legislature, and a new subsection (15) was 
added to Section 63-30-10, which in effect reinstated the substi-
tute remedy against governmental entitles which had been in effect 
for the 24-year period from 1966 to 1990. 
D. Former U.C.A. S 63-30-7(2) violates the open courts provisions 
because it took awav the remedy against governmental entities 
without providing anv substitute remedy whatsoever. 
During the one-year-and-six-day period that Section 63-30-7(2) 
was in effect, the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution were violated because the substitute 
remedy of suing governmental entities for the negligent acts of 
their police officers involved in high-speed chases was eliminated. 
Thus, during this period of time, no remedy whatsoever was provided 
to an injured plaintiff for the common law right to sue for 
negligence. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the 
failure of the legislature to provide a reasonably equivalent 
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remedy when it abrogates a common law right of action constitutes 
a violation of the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution.3 
E. Plaintiff's causes of action seek to vindicate rights protect-
ed by the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11. 
In Berry ex rel. Berry, supra. the Utah Supreme Court stated 
the following: "Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution is 
part of the Declaration of Rights. It declares that an individual 
shall have a right to a 'remedy by due course of law' for injury to 
'person, property or reputation."1 717 P.2d at 674. The Court in 
Berry goes on to define the term "rights" as it is used with 
reference to Article I, Section 11: 
The term "rights" when used with reference 
to section 11, is used loosely. Section 11 
protects remedies bv due course of law for 
injuries done to the substantive interests of 
person, property, and reputation. What sec-
tion 11 is primarily concerned with is not 
particular, identifiable causes of action as 
such, but with the availability of legal 
remedies for vindicating the great interest 
individuals in a civilized society have in the 
integrity of their persons, property, and 
reputations. 
717 P.2d at 677, n. 4 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's causes of action in the instant case seek remedies 
by due course of law for the negligent acts and omissions of the 
named Defendants and as-yet unnamed defendants if Plaintiff is 
3
 See Masich v. United States Smelting. Refining & Mining 
Co. . 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 
(1948); Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985); Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1989); Pavne ex rel. Payne v. Myers. 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987); Sun 
Valley Waterbeds of Utah. Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son. Inc. . 782 P.2d 
188 (Utah 1989). All of these cases, with the exception of Masich. 
are discussed in Point II.A of Plaintiff's original Brief. Masich 
is discussed in detail by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry. 
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allowed her day in court. The vindication of Plaintiff's common 
law right to recover for injuries proximately caused by the 
negligent acts or omissions of others is clearly allowed under Utah 
law and indeed guaranteed by the Utah Constitution in Article I, 
Section 11. 
Obviously, Plaintiff's particular, identifiable causes of 
action in the instant case would not have arisen in 1896 at the 
time of statehood, since motor vehicles had not yet been invented 
and there was no such thing as a high-speed chase. However, as 
clearly pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry/ this fact 
is irrelevant. The important fact is that the open courts 
provisions protect remedies by due course of law for injuries to 
persons and property. Plaintiff's negligence causes of action 
clearly fall within the scope of the rights and remedies protected 
by Article I, Section 11. 
The Defendants in their respective Briefs erroneously argue 
that Plaintiff's negligence claims are not recognized or remediable 
under Utah law, regardless of any application of the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act. The Defendants seek to define the issues in 
this case as whether or not the pursuing police officers had a duty 
to protect innocent third parties from the fleeing driver's 
negligence or recklessness, and whether or not this would make the 
Defendants insurers of the acts of any such fleeing suspects. 
The Defendants have completely misstated the issues and the 
nature of Plaintiff's negligence claims. Plaintiff does not seek 
a single penny from any of the Defendants for the negligence or 
recklessness of Steven Flovd, the fleeing driver. Plaintiff only 
seeks the opportunity for her day in court to present her negli-
10 
aence claims to a jury to determine whether the Defendants should 
be held accountable for their own negligence. Indeed, the trial 
court has already entered an Order joining Steven Floyd as a party 
Defendant for purposes of comparing his negligence to that of the 
Defendants pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 78-27-38 through 78-27-41 (R. 528-
529). Thus, it will be for the jury to determine what percentage 
of negligence responsible for Plaintiff's claims should be 
attributable to Floyd, the fleeing driver, and what percentage 
should be attributable to the various Defendants. 
Plaintiff will not reiterate here the extensive case law cited 
in Point II.B of her original Brief, which establishes the clear 
legal duty of pursuing police officers to innocent third parties in 
high-speed chases and the validity of negligence causes of action 
in such cases. A legal duty of due care is clearly imposed by Utah 
law on police officers engaged in high-speed pursuits, both under 
U.C.A. § 41-6-14 and under the common law irrespective of any 
statutory obligation.4 Plaintiff also pointed out to the Court in 
her original Brief that at least thirty-five cases from jurisdic-
tions outside Utah have held that a legal duty exists in high-speed 
chase cases analogous to Plaintiff's case and that the plaintiffs 
in each of these thirty-five cases had valid causes of action.5 
The State makes a specious argument and attempts to summarily 
dismiss the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Cornwall v. 
Larsen, supra. Plaintiff would point out to the Court that 
4
 See the discussion of the following cases on pp. 24-26 of 
Plaintiff's original Brief: Howe v. Jackson. 421 P.2d 159 (Utah 
1966); Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977); and Malan v. 
Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
5
 See pp. 26-30 of Plaintiff's original Brief. 
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Cornwall has been cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the subsequent cases of Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 
1980), and Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 351, 
382 (Utah 1989). It is surprising that the State would attempt to 
simply disregard the interpretation of U.C.A. § 41-6-14 by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Cornwall, 
It is also somewhat surprising that the State would make the 
tenuous argument that Section 41-6-14 does not impose a legal duty 
of due care on emergency vehicle operators, when the express 
language of said statute clearly imposes such a duty. The State 
also vainly attempts to distinguish Section 41-6-14 from the 
virtually identical statutes of other states which have held that 
this statute clearly imposes a duty of care on police officers 
involved in high-speed chases. The fact of the matter is that all 
of these emergency vehicle statutes have the same origin and are 
all virtually identical. The State/s attempt to point out one or 
two words which are different in the various statutes is an 
argument totally without merit. 
The State also erroneously relies on recent amendments to 
Section 41-6-14, contained in S.B. No. 79, passed in the 1993 
general session of the Utah Legislature (Addendum 3). S.B. No. 79 
was signed and approved by the Governor on March 12, 1993, and has 
an effective date of July 1, 1993. The State suggests that the 
amendments to Section 41-6-14 support the State's argument that 
this statute was not intended to impose a legal duty upon emergency 
vehicle operators. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, exactly the 
opposition conclusion must be drawn from the amendments to Section 
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41-6-14 contained in S.B. No. 79, The amendments specifically 
delete the duty language contained in subsections (2)(c) and (3) (a) 
of the statute, thereby clearly recognizing that the deleted 
language imposed a statutory duty on all emergency vehicle 
operators to operate their vehicles so they do not endanger life or 
property and with regard for the safety of all persons. 
The few cases cited by the Defendants in their respective 
Briefs are either factually inapposite to Plaintiff's causes of 
action in Utah because of different statutory schemes, or represent 
an archaic and disappearing viewpoint of a few jurisdictions; a 
viewpoint which is totally inconsistent and irreconcilable with the 
recent Utah Supreme Court decisions limiting and restricting 
governmental immunity as cited in Plaintiff's original Brief. In 
addition, many of the cases "string-cited" by the State on pp. 16-
17 of the State's Brief have been overruled and/or do not support 
the State's arguments against Plaintiff's negligence claims under 
the facts of the instant case. 
The Defendants rely heavily in their Briefs on the case of 
Thornton v. Shore. 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983), for the argument that 
Plaintiff has no valid cause of action in the instant case. 
Plaintiff submits that Thornton is a poorly-reasoned, result-
oriented decision which represents a dwindling minority of 
jurisdictions in this country. Moreover, most of the cases relied 
upon by the Thornton Court are either old, outdated cases; are 
statutorily or factually distinguishable; or have simply been 
reversed or overruled by subsequent case law. 
For example, Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co.. 245 S.W.2d 589, 
590-91 (Kan.App. 1952), is forty-one years old and completely 
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outdated by the modern trend of authority regarding negligence, 
pursuit cases and governmental immunity. 
The Thornton Court and the Defendants herein have also cited 
and relied upon State of West Virginia v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 
of New York, 263 F.Supp. 88 (S.D.W.Va. 1967). This case, which 
ostensibly applied West Virginia law in 1967, has clearly been 
rejected by the recent case of Peak v. Rati iff, 408 S.E.2d 300 
(W.Va. 1991). In Peak, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia specifically rejected the standard set out by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in Thornton which gives total immunity to the 
pursuing officer. Moreover, the Thornton Court's conclusion that 
the fleeing driver is the only party responsible for the injuries 
arising from the collision between the pursued vehicle and that of 
an innocent third party was also flatly rejected. 408 S.E.2d at 
306f 307. 
The Defendants also heavily rely upon the case of Reenders v. 
City of Ontario, 137 Cal.Rptr. 736 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1977). This 
case is the only California case which supports the erroneous 
arguments advanced by the Defendants in the instant case. The fact 
of the matter is that Reenders is a sixteen-year old rogue decision 
which has fallen into complete disfavor,, even in California, as 
none of the other districts have followed it. All of the other 
California districts of the Court of Appeals, and the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California (applying 
California law), have held that police in a pursuit of a suspect 
have a legal duty to drive in such a manner as to not impose on 
others an unreasonable risk of harm, which includes when the 
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motorist being pursued by the police collides with an innocent 
victim.6 
The Defendants' heavy reliance on Kellv v. City of Tulsa, 791 
P.2d 826 (Okla.App. 1990) , is also misplaced. In Kellv, the 
pursuit lasted approximately one minute, for a distance of one and 
one-quarter miles, at a speed estimated at 60-65 miles per hour, 
and only two other vehicles were on the road during the pursuit. 
The Kelly Court specifically held that under the undisputed facts 
of this case, "unlike the cases relied upon by Plaintiff" the 
"pursuit was not so extreme or outrageous as to pose a higher 
threat to public safety than ordinarily incident to high-speed 
police pursuit." (emphasis added). 791 P.2d at 829. Thus, it is 
clear the Oklahoma Court of Appeals based its decision on the 
"routine" nature of the pursuit in that case. The Kelly case is 
clearly factually inapposite to the extreme, out-of-control pursuit 
in the instant case. Furthermore, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in 
Kelly relied almost exclusively on the poorly-reasoned case of 
Thornton v. Shore, supra. 
POINT II 
APPLICATION OF FORMER U.C.A. S 63-30-7(2) (AMENDED 1990 
AND REPEALED 1991) TO PLAINTIFF VIOLATES THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
The arguments by both the State and City Defendants in 
opposition to Plaintiff's claims of equal protection and due 
6
 See Stark v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal.Rptr. 216 
(Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1985); Duarte v. City of San Jose. 161 Cal.Rptr. 
140 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1980); Gibson v. City of Pasadena, 148 
Cal.Rptr. 68 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1978); City of Sacramento v. 
Superior Court, 182 Cal.Rptr. 443 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1982); West v. 
United States, 617 F.Supp. 1015 (D.C. Cal. 1985)(applying Califor-
nia law) . 
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process violations rest entirely upon the erroneous argument that 
former U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) did not abrogate Plaintiff's rights 
under the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the 
Utah Constitution. Based upon this faulty premise, the Defendants 
argue that Plaintiff has never had a valid cause of action under 
Utah law, and there can therefore be no equal protection or due 
process violation. As already established in Point I of this Reply 
Brief, supra, these arguments by Defendants are fallacious because 
Plaintiff's negligence claims in the instant case seek vindication 
of rights clearly protected under Article I, Section 11. Thus, the 
Defendants essentially have no argument left challenging 
Plaintiff's arguments that she has been denied equal protection and 
due process under Article I, Section 24 and Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiff will not reiterate here the equal protection and due 
process arguments set forth in Points III and IV of her original 
Brief. Plaintiff would emphasize to the Court that the "heightened 
scrutiny" standard applied in Condemarin v. University Hospital, 
supra, is the proper standard to apply in the instant case. In 
that case, the Utah Supreme Court applied the heightened scrutiny 
standard in analyzing the equal protection and due process issues 
and properly determined that a mere damage limitation on potential 
recovery from the University Hospital violated equal protection and 
due process, as well as the open courts provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. The Condemarin decision recognized that even a mere 
damage limitation severely restricted the important substantive 
right of an individual to recover for personal injuries. The Court 
noted that the classifications created by the statute in question 
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interfered with the "fundamental principle of American law that 
victims of wrongful or negligent acts should be compensated to the 
extent that they have been harmed." 775 P.2d at 354. The Court, 
citing a 1975 decision by the Washington Supreme Court, further 
observed the following: 
The right to be [compensated] for personal 
injuries is a substantial property right, not 
only of monetary value but in many cases 
fundamental to the injured person's physical 
well-being and ability to continue to live a 
decent life. (citation omitted). 
775 P.2d at 360. 
In the instant case, the restriction of Plaintiff's rights is 
far more egregious that the damage limitation in Condemarin. 
Plaintiff's access to the courts for redress of her injuries has 
been totally eliminated by application of former U.C.A. § 63-30-
7(2) , not just restricted as in Condemarin. Plaintiff respectfully 
submits that the equal protection and due process violations are 
clear in Plaintiff's case, either under the heightened scrutiny 
standard or under the traditional rational basis standard. 
As pointed out in Plaintiff's original Brief, U.C.A. § 63-30-
7(2) was passed by the legislature based upon significant misinfor-
mation and untrue statements, and also upon a phantom crisis 
fearing a rash of "frivolous" lawsuits being filed in police 
pursuit situations. In the instant case, the Defendants did not 
present one iota of evidence indicating that a single "frivolous" 
lawsuit had ever been filed in the State of Utah by an innocent 
victim to recover from injuries incurred from a high-speed chase. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff believes that no such evidence exists, and 
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that there has never been a "frivolous11 lawsuit filed in Utah in 
this regard. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM 
SUIT UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION INU.C.A, 
6 63-30-10(1). 
U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1) retains governmental immunity for 
governmental entitles for negligent acts or omissions of an 
employee when the injury arises out of a discretionary function. 
Except in response to the Defendants' erroneous arguments regarding 
application of the discretionary/ministerial distinction, Plaintiff 
will not reiterate the arguments set forth in Point V of her 
original Brief. 
However, it is necessary to point out again that the Defen-
dants have absolutely disregarded the clear holding of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977). 
Cornwall held that a police officer responding to an emergency 
situation in his police car is an employee performing a ministerial 
act and not a discretionary act. 571 P.2d at 927. The subsequent 
case of Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980), cited by the 
State in its Brief, clearly reaffirms the holding in Cornwall. 
Therefore, it is simply beyond question and should be laid to rest 
that the pursuing police officers in the high-speed chase in the 
instant case were performing ministerial acts, and therefore their 
respective governmental employers are not immune from suit under 
U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1). 
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint also contains causes of 
action against the Defendant governmental entities for negligent 
training and supervision of police officers regarding high-speed 
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pursuits, and negligent implementation of procedures to be used in 
such high-speed pursuits. The Defendants mistakenly rely on Little 
v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), 
and Doe v. Arcruelles. 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985). Both of these 
cases support Plaintiff's argument that the alleged negligence of 
the as-yet unnamed individuals responsible for training, supervi-
sion and implementation of procedures occurred during the perfor-
mance of ministerial functions. 
In Little, the Utah Supreme Court held that the failure of the 
Division of Family Services to properly evaluate a foster home, 
supervise a child's placement, and protect her from harm constitut-
ed a breach of conduct implemental in nature and thus properly held 
actionable when found to be negligent. 667 P.2d at 52. In Doe, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the negligent supervision of a 
juvenile released into the community on probation was not protected 
as a discretionary function. The Court stated that: "A decision 
or action implementing a preexisting policy is operational in 
nature and is undeserving of protection under the discretionary 
function exception." (emphasis added). 716 P.2d at 283. 
The training and supervision of police officers and the 
implementation of procedures to be used in high-speed pursuits are 
operational in nature and merely implement the preexisting policy 
of the Department of Public Safety to identify and apprehend 
violators of the criminal law, utilizing pursuit driving when 
necessary. Therefore, Plaintiff's negligence claims regarding 
training, supervision and implementation of procedures are based 
upon the ministerial functions of the various responsible employ-
ees. 
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POINT IV 
QUESTIONS REGARDING CAUSATION AND NEGLIGENCE OF THE 
DEFENDANTS ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JURY TO DETER-
MINE, 
A* Summary judgment was improperly granted for the State Defen-
dants . 
Plaintiff has fully briefed the causation and negligence 
issues presented by the instant case in Point VI of her original 
Brief, and will not reiterate those arguments here. Suffice it to 
say that clear Utah law and the overwhelming weight of authority 
from jurisdictions throughout the country provide that issues of 
proximate causation and negligence are questions of fact to be 
determined by the finder of fact, and cannot be resolved as a 
matter of law on motions for summary judgment.7 
Surprisingly, the State actually puts forth the specious 
argument that summary judgment was properly granted against 
Plaintiff even under a gross negligence standard, rather than a 
simple negligence standard. The State completely ignores decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court and mistakenly relies entirely on a few 
factually inapposite decisions from other jurisdictions. Further-
more, the Utah Supreme Court has flatly stated that the ordinary 
7
 The Utah case law is set forth on pp. 40-43 of Plaintiff7s 
Original Brief. Although there are no Utah appellate cases directly 
dealing with high-speed pursuit situations such as presented in the 
instant case, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
issues of proximate cause and negligence are factual issues and 
cannot be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment. On pp. 
43-45 of her original Brief, Plaintiff cites twentv-one cases from 
jurisdictions outside of Utah which have held summary judgment on 
the issues of negligence (breach of duty) and proximate cause is 
inappropriate in cases involving high-speed pursuits where the 
pursued vehicle causes injury to a third person. 
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reasonable care standard applies to operators of emergency vehicles 
and all motor vehicles in general.8 
Moreover, the State Defendants, apparently disregarding the 
fact that they were the prevailing parties on their motions for 
summary judgment, inappropriately attempt to skew the facts of this 
case in their favor by claiming that the "danger involved in the 
pursuit did not clearly exceed the legitimate need to immediately 
apprehend Floyd, who Colyar reasonably suspected of having engaged 
in conduct considerably more serious that a speeding violation." 
This statement is clearly contrary to the facts of this case. The 
facts are that Colyar had absolutely no reason whatsoever to 
suspect Floyd of having engaged in conduct any more serious than a 
speeding violation, and the pursuit clearly exceeded the legitimate 
need to apprehend Floyd. Moreover, Plaintiff is entitled to have 
all facts and inferences drawn therefrom viewed by this Court in a 
light most favorable to Plaintiff, not the State. 
The State also argues it was not foreseeable that Floyd would 
"act so recklessly as to run a red light" and strike another 
vehicle, and "the risk involved in this pursuit was no greater than 
the risk ordinarily involved in a high-speed pursuit." The truth 
of the matter is the facts of this case compel the opposite conclu-
sion. Floyd was exceeding 120 miles per hour, running cars off the 
road, and in fact crashed into a semi-truck on the on-ramp to 1-15 
from Spanish Fork towards Provo and still proceeded to try to 
outrun the pursuing officers. Furthermore, whether or not it was 
8
 See Howe v. Jackson. 421 P.2d 159, 161-62 (Utah 1966); 
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 928-29 (Utah 1977); Malan v. 
Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 673 (Utah 1984); all cited and discussed, 
supra. 
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"foreseeable" that Floyd would injure an innocent third party is 
precisely the proximate cause issue which the Utah Supreme Court 
has directly held is a question of fact which precludes summary 
judgment. 
B. Summary judgment was improperly granted for the City Defen-
dants . 
For the same reasons that summary judgment was improperly 
granted for the State Defendants, it was also improperly granted 
for the City Defendants. The City Defendants' entire argument 
rests on the proposition that Officers James and Asay were not the 
initial pursuing officers, and since they were in pursuit behind 
Trooper Colyar they cannot be negligent as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff submits that this is an untenable argument. 
Whether or not the fleeing driver, Steven Floyd, ever saw 
Officers James or Asay in his rear-view mirror, or whether or not 
James or Asay might have been able to "leap frog" past Trooper 
Colyar during the chase, are simply not the relevant issues in this 
case. According to the theory of the City Defendants, if James or 
Asay had been able to pass Trooper Colyar and be the lead chase car 
behind Floyd, then they would have been liable, and not Colyar. 
The fact that Floyd may have only seen Colyar in his rear view 
mirror is irrelevant, as the important issue is whether James and 
Asay contributed to the "zone of danger" created by the high-speed 
pursuit, and whether it was foreseeable that Flovd might injure an 
innocent third party. These are clearly guestions of fact to be 
decided by the finder of fact, and preclude summary judgment for 
the City Defendants in the instant case. It is the province of the 
jury to apportion the negligence among the various pursuing police 
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officers and governmental entities. The trial court usurped the 
function of the jury by granting the City Defendants7 motion for 
summary judgment. 
POINT V 
SOUND PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS WHICH INJURE OR KILL INNOCENT 
BYSTANDERS, 
Since Plaintiff's deceased husband, Boyd Day, was killed on 
March 18, 1991, at least three other totally innocent people have 
died in Utah as a direct result of high-speed chases in which the 
fleeing driver killed an innocent victim. In all four of these 
cases, the initial justification for the pursuit involved a minor 
misdemeanor traffic violation. Indeed, statistics show that 
approximately seventy-two percent (72%) of all chases stem from 
traffic violations. Panic by the suspected offender, often times 
involving a fear of losing a drivers license, is the common reason 
for attempting to outrun the police. In addition to the four 
innocent people killed in the past two years or so, several 
innocent people have been severely injured, including Plaintiff; 
and at least two fleeing suspects themselves have been killed in 
high-speed chases.9 
Because of these deaths caused by high-speed police pursuits, 
Chief Ruben Ortega of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
announced a new policy in January of 1993 for high-speed pursuits. 
Noting that six people had been killed in Salt Lake County during 
9
 All of the above information is taken from a newspaper 
article: Norma Wagner, Police Chases: Deadly Force at High Speed. 
Salt Lake Tribune, Sunday, November 22, 1992, at Al and A10-11. 
Plaintiff would refer the Court to this article which takes 
approximately two full newspaper pages for a detailed analysis of 
high-speed police chases in Utah. 
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the past two years as a result of police pursuits, Chief Ortega 
stated the Salt Lake City Police can no longer afford to pursue 
those suspected of misdemeanors and traffic violations. Conse-
quently, Chief Ortega and the Salt Lake City Police Department 
adopted a new policy which now limits pursuits to suspects of 
violent crimes such as robbery/ rape, burglary, and homicide.10 
The Defendants argue in their respective Briefs that "sound 
public policy" weighs against imposing any liability whatsoever for 
police pursuit of fleeing violators, regardless of the risk created 
to the general public. The trial court in its Minute Entry Ruling 
and Orders Granting the Defendants7 Motions for Summary Judgment 
also ruled that the appropriate public policy in Utah is to 
completely insulate police officers and their governmental 
employers from any liability for high-speed chases (R. 530-535, 
545, 548). 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that sound public policy 
demands judicial accountability of police officers and their 
governmental employers for high-speed pursuits which injure or kill 
totally innocent bystanders. There is simply no justification for 
high-speed chases of drivers suspected of minor traffic violations. 
Plaintiff's response to the argument of the Defendants and the 
trial court that a fleeing suspect can evade police by driving at 
a high rate of speed into a congested traffic area is "so be it." 
Is the life of a totally innocent human being worth the necessity 
to apprehend a fleeing driver suspected of a minor traffic 
10
 All the above information is taken from a newspaper article: 
Chris Jorgensen, Salt Lake Police Hit Brakes on Pursuit Policy, Set 
UP Review Boards. Salt Lake Tribune, January 30, 1993, at CI. 
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violation? Plaintiff submits that sound public policy must answer 
this question strongly in the negative. 
If various police agencies continue to insist on engaging in 
high-speed pursuits involving suspected minor traffic violators, 
the only way to hold such agencies accountable is to ensure they 
are liable for their own negligence in any such chases. Police 
officers and their governmental employers cannot be given carte 
blanche authority and immunity in regard to the pursuit of minor 
traffic violators. Such high-speed pursuits create inherently 
dangerous and unnecessary risks to the general public which cannot 
be justified. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons and those set forth in 
Plaintiff's original Brief, it is respectfully submitted that the 
judgment of the trial court should be reversed in its entirety, and 
Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed to trial on her First 
Amended Complaint. 
DATED this ' day of 
., 1993. 
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES 
R. KELLER 
f€t/>s^ fZ.J^r&^k*™-
CRAIG BOORMAN 
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ADDENDUM 1 
1978 AMENDMENTS TO U . C . A . § 6 3 - 3 0 - 4 
Ch. 27 State Affairs In General [92] 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139, 
Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 103, Laws of Utah 1973, is 
amended to read: 
63-30-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) The word "state'' shall mean the state of Utah or any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university or other instrumentality thereof; 
(2) The words "political subdivision" shall mean any county, city, town, 
school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special im-
provement or taxing district, or any other political subdivision or public 
corporation: 
(3) The words "governmental entity" shall mean [ajid-iaetede] the state 
and its political subdivisions as defined herein; 
(4) The word "employee" shall mean any officer, employee 
or servant of a governmental entity including student teachers certificated 
in accordance with section 53-2-15, educational aides, volunteers and 
tutors; 
(5) The word "claim" shall mean any claim brought against a govern-
mental entity or its employee [as^era&ted-by-frhio act*] for which the entity 
may be liable; 
(6) The word "injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or 
loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, 
or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his 
agent. 
Section 2. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139, 
Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read: 
63-30*3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental enti-
ties [-9kaH-be3 are immune form suit for any injury which [mey-pesHfe-foftn 
vAC UCtlVltlCS Ol 9QJ.Q. CRtltlCO WnCrCHT OQIQ Cuun>3^ i o OngQgQQ Hft ^Tre GX0F616O 
«a»d-<iisehaFge- ef-a-gevenwaaentel- -fofiefciei*] results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility. 
Section 3. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139, 
Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read: 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability— 
Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of 
[93] State Affairs In General Ch. 27 
employee—Limitations on personal liability. 
Nothing contained in chis act, unless specifically provided, is to be con-
strued as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in so far as gov-
ernmental entities are concerned. Wherein immunity from suit is waived by 
this act, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the entity shall be de-
termined as if the entity were a private person. 
The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of au-
thority is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the em-
ployee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through gross negligence, 
fraud, or malice. 
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in 
a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of 
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of 
authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act 
due to gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
Section 4. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139, 
Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 189, Laws of Utah 1975, is 
amended to read: 
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any con-
tractual obligation and actions arising out of contractual rights or obliga-
tions shall not be subject to the requirements of sections 63-30-11. 63-30-12, 
63-30-13 or 63-30-19 of this act. 
Section 5. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139, 
Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read: 
63-30-11. Claim for injury—Notice—Claimant's petition for relief—Ser-
vice—Legal disability effect. 
Any person having a claim for injury to person or property against a 
governmental entity or its employee [isey-pefcifcien-9fti4] shall, before main-
taining an action under this act, file a written notice of claim with such 
entity for [any] appropriate relief including [fcheawa*€k>#] money damages. 
The notice of claim shall set forth a brief statement of the facts and the 
nature of the claim asserted, shall be signed by the person making the claim 
or such person's agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian, and shall be 
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(5) [The word "claim" shall mean] "Claim" means any claim [brought] 
or cause of action for monev or damages against a governmental entity or 
[+B] against an employee [for which the entity may be liablej: 
(6) [The word "injury"] "Injury" means death, iniury to a person, 
damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to 
his person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person 
or his agent: 
(7) "Personal iniurv" means an injury of anv kind other than property 
damage: 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to. or loss of. anv right, title, estate. 
or interest in real or personal property. 
Section 3. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-4. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last amended by Chapter 
27. Laws of Utah 1978. is amended to read: 
* * * * 63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability— 
Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of employee— 
Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this [aet] chapter, unless specifically provided. [» 
*e] shall be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in 
so far as governmental entities or their employees are concerned. [Wherein] 
If immunity from suit is waived by this [aet] chapter, consent to be sued is 
granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a 
private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting anv 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee mav otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an 
injury caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of 
such employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is. after the effective date of this act. exclusive of any other civil 
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the 
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to 
the claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through [gross ncgli 
gence,] fraudf-^  or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental 
entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one 
for which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee [skaH-] may 
be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the perfor-
mance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under 
color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to 
act due to [gross negligence.] fraud or malice. 
v*^' Section 4. Section amended. 
Section 63-30-5. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last amended by Chapter 
27, Laws of Utah 1978. is amended to read: 
ADDENDUM 3 
s# B# N o # ?g 1993 AMENDMENTS TO U.C.A. § 41-6-14 (Effective 7/1/93) 
Section 3. Section 41-6-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987, is amended to read: 
41-6-14, Emergency vehicles — Policy regarding vehicle pursuits — 
Applicability of traffic law to highway work vehicles — Exemptions. 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding 
to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected 
violator of the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a 
fire alarm, may exercise the privileges under this section, subject to 
[Stxbseetion] Subsections (2) through (4). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after 
slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits [if—the—operator-does-not 
endanger-iife-or-property]; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning 
in specified directions, 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a vehicle pursuit, 
apply only when the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal 
under Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle. 
[4a}—fhe-privTieges-ander-thTS-section-do-not-reiieve—the—operator 
of—an—anthorired-emergency—vehicie-from-the-daty-to-operate-the-vehTcie 
-9-
S. B. No. 79 
wrth-regard-for-the-safety-of-att-persons7-or-proteet-the—operator—from 
the-eonseqaenees-of-an-arbrtrary-exercise-of-the-prTviiegesT] 
(4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle pursuit apply only 
when: 
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds both an audible signal under 
Section 41-6-146 and uses a visual signal as defined under Section 
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle; 
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the vehicle has, in 
effect, a written policy which describes the manner and circumstances in 
which any vehicle pursuit should be conducted and terminated; 
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained in accordance with 
the written policy described in Subsection (4)(b); and 
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in conformance with 
standards established by the Department of Public Safety, Division of 
Peace Officer Standards and Training, which shall adopt minimum standards 
that shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies adopted by 
public agencies authorized to operate emergency pursuit vehicles* 
[fb*] £5) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this 
chapter does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment 
while actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway. However, 
the entire chapter applies to those persons and vehicles when traveling 
to or from the work. 
Section 4. Section 53A-16-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted 
by Chapter 2, Laws of Utah 1988, is amended to read: 
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